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Abstract: is there such a thing as European private law, a set of rules of EU law 
distinguished by the binary opposition public and private law? This article aims to 
shed light on the debate over the rise and the fall of the classic concept of private 
law and how the legal consciousness of the latter enhanced the legal awareness of 
European private law. Philosophy and sociology of law claim reasons in the search 
for answers, from a metaphysical and epistemological points of view. Furthermore, 
the reality of private law in practice put the ancient concepts in challenge by the 
phenomena of transnationalization of Law. Globalization, europanization, and 
the privatization of private Law are factual claims against the persistence of the 
classic concept of private law. These categories reveal the inconsistences between 
the theory of will in books and law in practice, suggesting that pluralism can face 
the lack of sense of a universal model of private law to all the realities involved 
in the European Union. The belief that the harmonization (or systematization) of 
national Civil Codes at the European level would lead to the coherence of private 
law is one of the bases to a final question about the extent to which the persistence 
of the classic concept of private law among legal scholarship is still an obstacle to 
the effectiveness of EU integration through the combination of public and private 
enforcement.
Keywords: private law; pluralism; globalism; integration; transnational law.
Resumo: existe algo como um direito privado europeu, um conjunto de regras do 
direito da União Europeia derivado da oposição binária entre os direitos público e 
privado?  Esse artigo pretende lançar luzes sobre a ascensão e a queda do conceito 
1  The author thanks the editorial board for the invitation to publish in the inaugural issue of the Academic Review DESC 
(Law, economics and contemporary society). I’d like to express my sincere appreciation.’
  97desc.facamp.com.br  |
DESC - Direito, Economia e Sociedade Contemporânea | Campinas | Vol. 1, n. 1 | p. 95-128 | Jul/Dez 2018
clássico de direito privado e sobre como a consciência legal deste último reforça 
a atenção dos juristas em torno de um direito privado europeu. A filosofia e a 
sociologia do direito reivindicaram razões nessa investigação, a partir de pontos 
de vista metafísicos e epistemológicos. Além disso, a realidade prática do direito 
privado desafia os conceitos antigos diante dos fenômenos da transnacionalização 
do direito. A globalização, europanização e a privatização do direito privado são 
reivindicações reais contra a persistência de um conceito clássico de direito privado. 
Essas categorias revelam as inconsistências entre a teoria da vontade na teoria e 
na prática, sugerindo que o pluralismo pode enfrentar a falta de sentido de um só 
modelo universal de direito privado para todas as realidades envolvidas na União 
Europeia. A crença de que a harmonização (ou sistematização) dos códigos civis 
nacionais a nível europeu conduziria à coerência do direito privado está na base 
de uma pergunta final sobre o quanto a persistência do conceito clássico de direito 
privado entre os juristas é ainda um obstáculo à eficácia da integração da UE ainda 
com base na combinação de regras públicas e privadas.
Palavras- chave: direito privado; pluralismo; globalização; integração; direito 
supranacional.
“Most questions and propositions of the philosopher result from the 
fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. They are 
of the same kind as the question whether the Good is more or less 
identical than the Beautiful” 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus
Introduction
Is there such a thing as European private law; a set of rules of EU law distinguished by 
the binary opposition public and private law? And if so, is this conceptual distinction anyhow 
functional to the way in which lawyers perceive or operate in plural legal systems? Over the 
years of research in the field of European Union (EU) law, I have continued searching for 
meaningful answers to these questions.2 By doing so, I witnessed two opposite reactions to 
the question of whether European private law is such a thing. On one side are those who think 
these are the meaningful questions; on the other are those who dismiss them. 
Between dismissals and acceptance of the European private law as a thing, there is a 
learned lesson. The reason for the opposite reactions does not lie in the genuine disagreement 
of whether the substantive dimension suggested as European private law exist or not; or 
2  As Research Associated to the European Regularity Private Law Project financed by the European Research Council 
Advanced Grant [Project ID: 269722]. See ALMEIDA, Lucila, Integration through Self-Standing European Private Law 
(2017).    
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whether the dichotomic distinction is a mere theoretical debate without practical effects. The 
reason, instead, lies in the logic of our language. It lies in the different, and mostly divergent, 
concepts of private law – what is here distinguished as the classic versus the modern concepts.
This article aims to shed light on the debate over the rise and the fall of the classic 
concept of private law.3 It does so through explaining how the awareness of the latter enhanced 
the legal consciousness of European private law. Provoking a reflection over the rise and fall 
of the classic concept of private law in Europe is then the mean to better understand how 
plural legal orders interact and shape individuals’ behaviors, and, above all, why it should 
matter to legal scholarship and legal practice within and beyond the boundaries of the EU. 
Taking a leaf out of the Wittgenstein’s book on the logic of our language, the meaning of a 
sentence is determined as soon as the meaning of the components of the words is known.4 
The words are then private law.
On the one hand, those who perceive private law through a classic conceptual lens 
define its subject as a coherent codified body of rules, made by States, and grounded in 
autonomy-based value (i.e. freedom of contract).5 The expression European private law is 
therefore senseless as long as it refers to a body of rules that is not autonomous based-
value, is supranational and made by transnational governmental bodies. The persistence of 
the classic concept of private law has hampered debates over the private law dimension of the 
European integration project; as well as its interaction with national legal systems of private 
law, its remedies, and procedures.6 As a result of legal practice, lawyers are short-sighted 
to think of the horizontal effect of EU law. In other words, whenever individuals or private 
legal entities violate EU law (e.g. the use of a certain selling arrangement that discriminates 
3  The title of this chapter borrows the dichotomy – “Rise and Fall” – as a reference to the remarkable works of private legal 
scholars who employed the expression to discuss the transformation of Private Law thinking focusing on British and American 
legal systems. Atiyah in “The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract” and Duncan Kennedy in “Rise and Fall of Classic Legal 
Thought” adopt genealogy to deconstruct the classic theory of private law as the result of the mainstream ideology of the 19th 
century. Kennedy, Duncan. Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought. Washington, DC: BeardBooks, 2006. Atiyah, P. S. The 
Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract. Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, 2017.
4  Wittgenstein, Ludwig, David Pears, and Brian McGuinness. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Routledge, 1975.
5  There are two formalistic approaches to private law. One claims the private law is a system of rules with neutral-values. 
These arguments are commonly associated with Will Theorists of the 19th century. The other advances a more sophisticated 
argument. It does not deny the moral ethics of private law, but grounds the moral ethics in deontological autonomy values. 
Ernest Weinrib develops this argument best. The classic Concept of Private Law as mentioned in this chapter refers to these 
two formalistic approaches to private law. See Weinrib, Ernest J. The Idea of Private Law. Revised edition. Oxford, United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2012.    
6  This article is not the first piece of academic work blaming the persistence of Classic Legal Thinking (or Formalism) in 
Europe as a reason to reject the private dimension of EU Law. See Caruso, 1997, 2013; Kennedy, 1997, 2000. Caruso, Daniela. 
“The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal Integration.” European Law Journal 3, 
no. 1 (1997); Caruso, Daniela. “The Baby and the Bath Water: The American Critique of European Contract Law.” American 
Journal of Comparative Law 61 (2013): 479–506. See also Kennedy, Duncan. “The Paradox of American Critical Legalism.” 
European Law Journal 3, no. 4 (1997): 359–77. See also the historical approach by Letto-Vanamo, Pia. “Fragmentation and 
Coherence of Law - a Historical Approach.” In Coherence and Fragmentation in European Private Law, edited by Pia Letto-
Vanamo and Jan M. Smits. Sellier European Law Publishers, 2012.
DESC - Direito, Economia e Sociedade Contemporânea | Campinas | Vol. 1, n. 1 | p. 95-128 | Jul/Dez 2018
  99desc.facamp.com.br  |
undertakings based on the nationality of the controlling shareholder), harmed individuals 
could challenge violations before national Civil Courts through private legal remedies such 
as financial compensations.
Two intellectual developments have long contested the classic concept of private law 
during the 20th century: one based on philosophy of law and committed to challenge formalism; 
the other bringing a perspective from the sociology of law. Both intellectual developments, 
underpinned by metaphysical and epistemological reasons respectively, converge into one 
conclusion: the classic concept of private law is dead; or must be so. 
The modern concept of private law, instead, departs from the definition of private 
law according to its subjects. Private law is defined as any rule applied to the subject of 
contracts, torts, property, and associations. Regardless of whether the provision is found 
in a civil code, a Decree-Law issued by a regulator, trade agreements, or a sophisticated 
transnational legal system like the EU, what defines them as a rule of private law is the 
commonality of a regulated subject. Therefore, the modern concept rejects the misleading 
definition of private law as power-conferring rules intended to protect the will of parties 
only. But it also reveals private law as a set of duty-imposing rules enshrining duties7 on 
individuals to make transactions under obligations of non-discriminate, or fair competition, 
and other legal obligations embedded on a plurality of moral ethics ranging from utilitarian, 
social, to autonomous-based values.8
To understand the relevance of the modern concept of private law to legal practice, 
EU law does matters. The EU legal system is the epitome of a transnational legal system 
grounded in a policy-oriented mandate: the creation of an integrated and competitive 
transnational market. To pursue its mandate, the EU has advanced a set of rules regarding 
product liability, rights to withdraw, information duties, and other duties and rights governing 
contracts, property, and liability. These rules make the private law dimension of EU law 
uncontestable. The legal consciousness of the private law dimension of EU law matters. For 
instance, a right to withdrawal established at transnational level is only effective if legal 
practitioners share a certain level of legal consciousness about those rights to enforce them 
in private disputes.9  This is the reason for beginning this chapter by quoting Wittgenstein’s 
7  Klass, Gregory. “Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule.” New York University Law Review, 2008, 
1726–83; Hart, H. L. A. (Herbert Lionel Adolphus). The Concept of Law. Clarendon Press, 1961.
8  Gordley, James. The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine. Clarendon Law Series. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991.The three moral ethics approach to consent in private law –led-rights, led-utilitarianism, led-duty – refer to moral 
autonomy, utilitarian, and social value respectively. Beyleveld, Deryck, and Roger Brownsword. Consent in the Law. Hart, 2007.
9  Denis Galligan identified “the Contours of Compliance” as the main conditions to promote social “changes through Law” 
in Modern Societies. Between them, he listed Legal Consciousness, a Settle Disposition to Comply with Law, and Legal 
Architecture that allows the dynamic change of the law. Denis, ed. Law in Modern Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016, pp. 332-341.
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book “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus”: “most questions and propositions of the philosopher 
result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language”. 
The paper has three parts. The first part (1) introduces the problem of how different 
concepts of private law have hampered genuine discussions on European private law in the 
context of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (hereinafter DCFR). It also introduces 
the first hints of claims developed in the next two subsections on why the classic concept of 
private law needs to be reviewed. The second part (2) of this chapter borrows a genealogical 
account from legal historians and philosophers to understand the origins of the classic concept 
of private. This sets the groundwork for the subsequent map of arguments raised by two 
different intellectual projects that both end by deconstructing this classic way of thinking: 
one based on the philosophy of law (2.1), and the other on the sociology of law (2.2). The 
latter intellectual development is then subdivided in two more subsections to observe the 
phenomenon of the transformation of private law: one that explains the transformation 
of private law within and by States (2.2.1), the other that observes the transformation of 
private law beyond States (2.2.2).  The third part (3) then raise a question about the extent to 
which the persistence of the classic concept of private law among legal scholarship is still an 
obstacle to the effectiveness of EU integration through the combination of public and private 
enforcement.
1. Breaking paradigms: Draft Common Frame of Reference and the awakening of the 
European private lawyers
The beginning of the 21st century was also the beginning of a new round of debates 
among private lawyers in Europe motivated by the Commission’s audacious plan to draft 
the European civil code. Before it, the last two decades of the 20th century were marked by 
the academic debate about the EU’s bold move from solely negative integration towards the 
political process of positive integration.10 Rules on consumer and company law were seen as 
the most advanced intervention of EU law into private law.11 
The European codification project in the early 21st century set new ground for the 
debate on European private law. The 2001 Communication of the European Commission 
launched the first initiatives of what was “the action plan on a more coherent European 
10  The distinction of negative integration and positive integration employed along this chapter follows the definition created by 
Fritz Scharpf in 1999, in which the former refers to the community integration mostly based on the enforcement of rights in the 
Treaties, and the latter refers to the positive integration through the approval of Secondary Law. Later, Hugh Collins used the same 
distinction to explain the process of Europeanization of private law. See chapter 2 “Negative and Positive Integration” in Scharpf, 
Fritz. Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? Oxford University Press, 1999. Collins employs the same term to discuss 
European Private Law. See Collins, Hugh. The European Civil Code: The Way Forward. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
11  The consumer legal measures at EU level started with the Directive 85/374/EEC on product liability and later moved 
towards the Directive 93/13/ECC on unfair terms in consumer and Directive 1999/44/EC on consumer sales.  
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Contract Law”.12 The Commission’s plans provoked a large academic debate across Europe 
on the legitimacy of a European code of contract, which would have precluded national civil 
codes totally or partially. 
The project, which started with the establishment of a working group, a so-called 
network of excellence, reached its highest point in 2008 with the release of the first edition 
of the DCFR, which was reedited and released in its full in 2009.13 Ten comprehensive books 
together with “the Fundamental Principles of European Contract Law” would have formed, as 
the authors said, a coherent body of “European Contract Law”. Resembling the codification 
of private law in civil law systems, the DCFR addressed book-by-book, chapter-by-chapter, 
the core concepts of private law common to all legal systems – such as obligation, contractual 
liability, and unjust enrichment – which would have normative standards of conduct applicable 
to any individuals engaged in transactions within the EU’s jurisdiction. Moreover, besides the 
duties and obligation, the DCFR determined four principles as fundamental values: freedom, 
security, justice, and efficiency.14 
Despite the fact that approximately 200 academics were behind the draft of the DCFR, 
the European codification project triggered different reaction among legal scholars in Europe, 
which instigated the vivid academic debate pro and contra the DCFR. By observing the 
arguments from both sides, one could map the debate in claims and arguments that circle 
around key conceptual and normative questions: what private law is – the concept of private 
law – and what private law should be.15
The first layer of argument contra the DCFR circled around the metaphysical concept 
12  European Commission Communication, “A more Coherent European Contract Law – An Action Plan”, COM (2003) 68 
final, 2003.
13  The Study Group on a European Civil Code and Research Group on the EC Private Law, “Principles, Definition and Model 
Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference”, the Study Group on a European Civil Code and Research 
Group on the EC Private Law. Acquis group’ in Christian von Bar, Eric Clive and Hans Schulte-Nölke (eds) (2009).
14  The first version of the DCFR was released in the 2008 edition, in which it enumerated a broad list of principles as 
principles of Contract law. In the 2009 full edition of the DCFR entitled “Principles, Definition and Model Rules of European 
Private Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference”, the Study Group on a European Civil Code and Research Group reduced 
the long list of principles to “four fundamental principles”: freedom, security, justice and efficiency.
15  For detailed discussions of competences with respect to private law: Micklitz, Hans W. “Review of Academic Approaches 
on the European Contract Law Codification Project.” In Liber Amicorum Guido Alpa: Private Law Beyond the National 
Systems, edited by Mads Tønnesson Andenaes, Silvia Diaz Alabart, Sir Basil Markesinis, Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, and Nello 
Pasquino. British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2007. Weatherill, Stephen. “The European Commission’s 
Green Paper on European Contract Law.” Journal of Consumer Policy 24, no. 3–4 (December 1, 2001). Weatherill, Stephen. 
“Why Object to the Harmonization of Private Law by the EC?” European Review of Private Law 12, no. 5 (January 1, 2004): 
633–60. Weatherill, Stephen. “Reflections on the EC’s Competence to Develop a European Contract Law.” European Review 
of Private Law 13, no. 3 (January 1, 2005): 405–18. Kenny, M. “The 2003 Action Plan on European Contract Law : Is the 
Commission Running Wild?” European Law Review. 28, no. 4 (March 22, 2007): 538–50; Ziller, Jacques. “The Legitimacy 
of the Codification of Contract Law in View of the Allocation of Competences between the European Union and Its Member 
States.” In The Politics of a European Civil Code, edited by Martijn Willem Hesselink. Kluwer Law International, 2006. 
Hesselink, Martijn W. “The Politics of a European Civil Code.” European Law Journal 10, no. 6 (November 1, 2004): 675–97. 
Van Gerven, Walter. “Codifying European Private Law: Top Down and Bottom Up.” In An Academic Green Paper on European 
Contract Law, edited by Stefan Grundmann and Jules Stuyck. London: Kluwer Law International, 2002. 
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of what private law is. Some legal scholars asserted that the EU wouldn’t have had the 
delegated authority to enact a European civil code or even regulate private law as long as the 
conferred powers of the Treaty were restricted to improving the conditions of the functioning 
of the international market. That limited private law to its classic concepts. On the other 
hand, legal scholars countered this point by holding that the EU’s conferred powers are not 
organized in line with the classic concepts of public and private law. Thomas Wilhelmsson 16 
stressed the point that multiculturalism in Europe hampered the development of a coherent 
European Contract Law. Leone Niglia argued that, though the DCFR embraced pluralistic 
vocabulary, it perpetuated the hierarchical thinking of universal principles (universalism in 
pluralistic thinking).17 
The second layer of arguments contra the DCFR challenged the normative approach 
to private law as a coherent system of norms based on deontological-autonomous virtuous. 
The DCFR established four principles as fundamental principles of European contract law: 
contractual freedom, security, justice, and efficiency. One could claim that the four fundamental 
principles are conflictual by themselves. By stressing the horizontal dimension of pluralism in 
European private Law, Norbert Reich, and Hans Micklitz questioned the “four main European 
Contract law principles” of the DCFR by shedding light on the already existing “pluralism of 
– possibly conflicting – principles in private law and the EU on which the DCFR is based”. 18 
In parallel, the Study Group of private legal scholars published a paper entitled “Social Justice 
and European Contract Law: the Manifesto”. 19 By departing from the assumption that private 
law has long been instrumentalised by States to accomplish social justice, the article served as 
a manifesto to reassure the continuity of the social values of private law.
Fifteen years have already passed since the first European Commission’s initiative 
towards the creation of a grand codification at the Union level. The cooldown of both 
political and academic debates on the European Civil Code confirmed the predicted political 
unfeasibility of the Commission’s plan. Moreover, the later withdrawal of the draft proposal 
16  Thomas Wilhelmsson, “Varieties of Welfarism in European Contract Law.” European Law Journal 10, no. 6 (November 
2004): 712–33. Wilhelmsson, Thomas. “Introduction: Harmonization and National Cultures.” In Private Law and the Many 
Cultures of Europe, edited by Thomas Wilhelmsson, Elina Paunio, and Annika Pohjolainen. Kluwer Law International, 2007.
17  Leone Niglia argues that the DCFR does not reproduce the hierarchical and formalistic thought of 19th century, which 
eliminates from the legal frame anything that is plural. For Niglia, it is a new way in which “formalism has been rearranged to 
meet the contingent policy demands coming from the European Commission. What matters in this perspective is the morality 
of the universal values that are presumed to be the best for ruling the plurality of legal orders”. Niglia, Leone. “Pluralism in 
a New Key: Between Plurality and Normativity.” In Pluralism and European Private Law, edited by Leone Niglia. Oxford: 
Hart, 2013, p. 250-251. See also Niglia, Leone. “The Question Concerning the Common Frame of Reference.” European Law 
Journal 18, no. 6 (2012).
18  Norbert, Reich. “Monistic Ideology versus Pluralistic Reality: Towards a Normative Design for European Private Law.” In 
Pluralism and European Private Law, edited by Leone Niglia. Oxford: Hart, 2013. pp. 78-79
19   “Social Justice in European Contract Law: A Manifesto.” European Law Journal 10, no. 6 (2004); Hesselink, Martijn 
Willem. CFR & Social Justice: A Short Study for the European Parliament on the Values Underlying the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference for European Private Law: What Roles for Fairness and Social Justice? Sellier, 2008.
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on a Common European Sales Law by the Commission 20 reinforced the unpalatable taste of 
the Commission’s plan in harmonizing rules of private law through broad packages, which 
would have invalidated large parts of civil codes.  
If, on the one hand, the DCFR failed in being enacted as the first supranational civil 
code, on the other hand, it was very successful in gathering private legal scholars from all 
over Europe, unprecedently, to discuss what private law is and what private should be at the 
conceptual and normative levels. It was the awakening of European private lawyers.
Some of the arguments for and against the DCFR project revealed that lawyers do 
not agree on the concept of private law in Europe or worldwide. One of the reasons is the 
persistence of the use of classic private law among lawyers, particularly in civil law traditions. 
Within the traditional frame, the concept of private law has defined itself as a coherent (or 
uniform), and hierarchical (monistic) system of law based on the virtue of autonomy (or 
individuals’ will). 21 If one applies this concept of private law to understand how the law has 
governed transactions, they will find evidence for and against to maintain their perception. 
The traditional definition of private law would depict power-conferring rules which allow 
individuals to establish obligations between each other: the law created by private parties and 
enforced between these private parties while doing transactions or joint ventures. 
Both civil and common law systems embrace principles of pacta sunt servanda whereby 
consent is the foundations of validity: the individuals’ will must be observed as the law between 
parties. However, this concept of private law does not capture the principles and rules that 
conflict with autonomy-based value. It struggles to explain principles rooted in private law that 
have existed since Roman Law such as culpa in contrahendo, which is found today in both the 
civil and common law systems; the private law within States. 22 Even those who consider culpa 
in contrahendo as positive duties of information aligned rather than conflicting an autonomy-
based theory of private law,23 get into trouble when explaining why notions of good faith and 
fair dealing, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment are chapters of textbooks on contract 
20  COM(2011) 635 final.
21  The assertion that the classic concept of private law tends to be endorsed by private lawyers in Civil Law system, where 
Private Law is systematized in Civil Codes, it does not mean there are no legal scholars in common law system advocating for 
the traditional concept of private law. In fact, Professor Ernest Weinrib, who is the most preeminent defender of Formalism in 
Private Law nowadays, has a common law as a reference to defend his idea of an “Immanent Rationality of Law”. Weinrib, 
Ernest J. “Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law.” Yale Law Journal 97, no. 6 (1988).
22  The concept of culpa in contrahendo could go back in time to the seminal article written by Rudolf von Jhering in 1861, 
entitled “Culpa in contrahendo, oder Schadensersatz bei nichigen oder nicht zur Perfektion gelangten Verträgen”. Rudolf von 
Jhering advanced the thesis that private parties in private relationships have the duty of acting in good faith and, if so, sellers 
have the obligation to inform (information duty) certain conditions features of good or service to buyers during negotiations, 
which has long been recognized as principles of Private Law in German Private Law and beyond. Frederich Kessler and Edith 
Fine published in 1964 the comparative studies on how the notion of good faith and fair dealing in the American legal system 
have served many of the doctrinal functions of culpa in contrahendo. Kessler, Friedrich, and Edith Fine. “Culpa in Contraendo, 
Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study.” Harvard Law Review 77, no. 3 (1964): 401–49.
23  Dagan (2005).
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law. Besides all the inconsistencies between the classic theory of private law and private law 
within States, it gets even worse when rules dealing with preliminary negotiation, default, and 
information duties are enacted by supranational bodies, which overlap with national systems 
of private law and sometimes have conflicting values. 
Considering the EU Legal System is per se plural and functional, those who read 
those through the classic concept of private law tend to deny the existence of European 
Private Law. However, if interlocutors who reject European private law are the same scholars 
who agree with the proposition that culpa in contrahendo is a private law doctrine, what 
could be their answer when the Product Liability Unfair Term Directives is under scrutiny? 
Though EU Law, both have rules imposing information duties and withdrawal rights. If the 
classic concept of private law solely captures one part of a whole body of rules commonly 
described as private law, why are lawyers and (some) legal scholars still replicating and 
reproducing a Theory of Private Law is a coherent system of rules based on autonomy-based 
value or neutrality?24
There are two reasons for the persistence of the classical theory of private law in 
lawyers mind, particularly those in civil law systems. It starts with the way in which legal 
education programs have been systematized. To accommodate the debate on the public and 
private law divide raised by Welfare States, 25 legal subjects were allocated in rigid boxes: 
one for national public law, another for national private law; one for international public law, 
another for international private law.
Moreover, program content of national private law was and is still divided according 
to civil codes: civil, obligations, property rights, tort, family, or succession. Within this 
frame, disciplines like labor law, competition law, and sectorial regulation are treated either 
as public law or disciplines in the peripheries of private law.26 
Yet the public and private law divide of legal education is not the only cause for path-
dependence on the classic theory of private law, but merely a facilitator. The nexus of causality 
lies in the persistence of the classic concept of private law in legal scholarship, which spills 
24  Hans-W. Micklitz described his own experience as a private lawyer engaged in conversations and academic debates about 
“Autonomy”, where people use the same term but have a different concept in their minds. He does call it (un) consciousness 
lost in translation. Micklitz, Hans-Wolfgang. “On the Intellectual History of Freedom of Contracts and Regulation.” Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 4, no. 1 (December 2015).
25  Micklitz, Hans-W. “Rethinking the Public/Private Divide.” In Transnational Law: Rethinking European Law and Legal 
Thinking, edited by Miguel Maduro, Kaarlo Tuori, and Suvi Sankari. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. Reich, 
Norbert. “The Public/Private Divide in European Law.” In European Private Law after the Common Frame of Reference, edited 
by Hans W. Micklitz and Fabrizio Cafaggi. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2010.
26  Kaarlo Tuori’s contribution to the 1st Annual ERPL Conference describes the public and private law division as a systematization 
that no longer represents Law in modern societies. Tuori continues arguing that terms like hybridity, commonly associated with 
transitional legal systems, is sometimes used to cover “conceptual confusions” about what law is and what is not law. See Tuori, 
Kaarlo. “On Legal Hybrids.” In A Self-Sufficient European Private Law: A Viable Concept? edited by Hans W. Micklitz and Yane 
Svetiev. EUI Working Paper 2012/31, ERC-ERPL 01/2012. Florence: European University Institute, 2012.
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over into legal practice. Teaching private law categorically as means to autonomy-based 
value or neutrality inhibits lawyers from thinking about private law through a broader lens. It 
presents private law as an apolitical or neutral body of law when in fact the whole substance 
of private law reflects political choices and moral values. This is the truth that explains rules 
protecting individuals will written in testaments, rules determining contractual capacity 
above or below a certain age, which by the way were denied to women just a few decades 
ago,27 and rules avoiding slayers to profit from wrongdoing.28        
In opposition to the classic concept of private law, an acute awareness of the 
incompatibility between private law in books and private law in practice has pushed the 
agenda on the modernization (or transformation) of private law thinking. Scholars claim 
there is a need to reconnect the theory of private law with what private law is within and 
beyond States. Rather than having a concept of private law define the feature of its rules (i.e. 
systematic and coherent) or restrain its ends to one value or no value, the modern concept 
of private law has two dimensions. It embraces the concept that first identifies the subject of 
private law, and further provides conceptual tools to validate the law regulating the subject, 
rules and values. 
Andrew Burrows provides us with a very precise and succinct account of the subject 
of private law. 29
“The law of Property defines the boundaries of our rightful possessions, while the law 
of torts seeks to make us whole against violations of those boundaries, as well as against 
violations of the natural boundaries of our physical person. Contract law ratifies and 
enforces our joint ventures beyond these boundaries”     
If the private law is dynamic, the concept of private law firstly refers to its subject (i.e. 
contract, property, tort, and association), rather than the feature of its rules. Secondly, private 
law, as any other law, has to pass through a validity test based on social rules of recognition. 
Gregory Klass define rules of contract law as the combination of two pictures.30 He refers to 
private law as a combination of power-conferring rules and duty-imposing rules. 
A similar approach to private law can be found in Dyerck Beyleveld and Roger 
Brownsword in the ethics of consent.31 While power-conferring rules provide individuals 
27  See Currie, Brained. “Women’s Contracts: A Case Study in Conflict of Law Method.” The University of Chicago Law 
Review 25, no. 2 (Winter 1958).
28  See Mutual Life Insurance v. Armstrong, the landmark case establishing the Slavery Doctrine in the American legal system. 
29  Burrows, Andrews. “Contract, Tort and Restitutions. A Satisfactory Division or Not?” LQR 99 (1983). Also, Zimmermann, 
The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 1996.
30  Gregory Klass (2008).
31  Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword map the Ethics of Consent though identifying three approaches to consent: 
A Utilitarian approach, a Right-led Approach, and a Duty-led Approach. Instead of describing private law from one of the 
ethics of consent, they rely on the moral theory of Alan Gewirth to explain how private law deals with the plurality of ethical 
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with the power to establish law between parties through the manifestation of consent, duty-
imposing rules limit individuals’ autonomy in light of moral and social values. The same rule 
of recognition that validates legal norms enshrining rights and duties and govern behavior, also 
validates a plurality of ethical perspectives. If so, the rule of recognition that validated rules 
restraining the contractual capacity of women in the 1950s is the same rule of recognition that 
validates equal rights for women in the 21st century. The rule of recognition did not change in 
half a century. What change was the duty-imposing rules and values in legal systems.
Private law is composed of dynamic rules that reflect the values of a society over time. 
Therefore, the theory of private law that conjures a classic sense is misleading because it, at 
best, refers to a theory of private law in conformity with liberal States in the 19th century or, 
at worst, refers to a normative theory of private law developed with descriptive term with the 
aim of avoiding distribution of wealth within society. At best or at worst, the classic concept 
of private law became obsolete throughout the time. In contrast, if the concept of private 
law refers to its subject, it allows an observer to see the dynamic of how law governs private 
relationships regardless the values of the society at a certain moment in time. One will see 
that private law was and is still functional and dynamic. (Private) Law is meant to ends and, 
along with history, these ends have oscillated between values: autonomy (moral) values, 
social values, and utilitarianism values.32 
Since the early 1990s, legal scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have advocated 
for the deconstruction of classic private law thinking. Legal scholars in both the US and 
Europe, though disagreements about the causes that justify the detachment of laws in book 
and law in action (the two intellectual developments), favored private law reexamination (one 
conclusion). They both deconstruct the deontological-autonomous virtuous as the normative 
basis of private law. 
In the 1980s the same discussion went beyond Sate borders and reached transnational 
legal systems. Different from prior studies, which assessed private law within States, European 
and International lawyers started to observe the emergence of private law beyond States. 
Being the most advanced transitional body of law with a policy mandate of having integrated 
markets, the European integration project spilled over into private law. 
European private lawyers have long observed the expansion of the European 
integration project upon private since the late 1970s. 33 European Private Law thus means 
perspectives. Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword op. cit., pp. 32-38.        
32  Patterson, Dennis M. “Reviewed Work: The Idea of Private Law by Ernest J. Weinrib.” Modern Law Review 58, no. 6 
(1995): 916–17.
33  Among several private law scholars that dedicated their work to understand the process of Europeanization of Private Law, 
special attention must be given to the Acquis Group, which was established to analyze the existing acquis communautaire. They 
were those who raised their voices to argue that EU legal order had interfered in contract law through the body of rules in EU 
DESC - Direito, Economia e Sociedade Contemporânea | Campinas | Vol. 1, n. 1 | p. 95-128 | Jul/Dez 2018
  107desc.facamp.com.br  |
the gradual enactment of imposing-duties rules governing contract, tort, and property, and 
joint venture, which then overlap with national private law in contract law, tort law, property 
law, and company law. When the EU legal system steps into private law, legal scholars have 
described the intersection with national legal system as not a single path. European private 
law could provoke different reactions in national legal systems: divergence or convergence, 
resistance, or intrusion.34
As has been said, theoretical propositions about the transformation of private law 
thinking are not exclusive to European legal scholarship. Yet the EU legal system represents 
the epitome of transnational law, and, therefore, the foundations of European private law and 
its interaction with national private law in Member States is more complex than any other 
private law beyond State. These are the reasons why the next subsections are divided into two 
parts: one on the deconstruct of the classic private law thinking within States, the other on the 
rise of the modern concept of private law beyond States.   
2. Deconstructing the Classic Concept within and beyond States: Two Intellectual 
Developments, One Conclusion
The classic concept of private law does not belong to any ancient theory of law or 
private law. On contrary, it was brought with a 19th century codification project of national 
civil codes and, since it, has persisted as the mainstream way of thinking about private law 
within national legal systems.35 The classic concept of private law derives from a well-succeed 
intellectual movement that intentionally defined private law as a system of rules based on the 
virtuous of autonomy (i.e. as a means to protect the parties will) as the normative framework 
of a coherent, hierarchical and monistic system is and must be challenged in legal scholarship 
and legal practice.
Despite the establishment of the classic concept of private law as a mainstream thinking, 
there have always been legal scholars criticizing the metaphysical and epistemological 
foundations of classic private law. In order to understand the critical thinking of those who 
argue in favor of the modernization of classic private law, the birth of classic private law need 
primary and secondary law and Court decision. This article has benefited immensely from the proposition on the substantive and 
institutional aspects of European Private Law that were formulated for their member. See Gerhard Dannemann, Consolidating 
EC Contract Law: An Introduction to the Work of the Acquis Group, in Acquis Group, Contract I: Pre-contractual Obligations, 
Conclusions of Contracts, Unfair Terms. See also Christian Twigg-Flesner, The Europeanization of Contract Law, 2008. Twigg-
Flesner, Christian. The Europeanisation of Contract Law: Current Controversies in Law. Routledge-Cavendish, 2007.
34  The categories of conflicting and resistance, convergence, intrusion and substitution, are categories developed by Hans 
W-Micklitz within the framework of the ERPL Project. See Micklitz, Hans-W. “The Visible Hand of European Regulatory 
Private Law—The Transformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation.” 
Yearbook of European Law 28, no. 1 (2009): 3–59. See also Micklitz, Hans-W. editor, Yane Svetiev, and Guido Comparato. 
European Regulatory Private Law: The Paradigms Tested. European University Institute, 2012.
35  Kennedy, Duncan. “From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s ‘Consideration and Form.’” 
Columbia Law Review 100, no. 94 (2000): 94–175.
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to be clarified. In this regard, James Gordley is notable for tracing the origins of the legal 
doctrine of private law. Gordley uses his findings to underpin metaphysical and normative 
reasons as to why there is a need for the modernization of private law thinking. 
Before the establishment of classic private law thinking in the 19th century, the 
philosophical school of scholasticism in the 16th and 17th centuries were recognized for their 
efforts in building a coherent system of doctrines and principles of roman law. However, as 
James Gordley stresses, scholastics preserved key inherent concepts from Aristotle’s theory 
of ethics such as just price and equitable contract terms in the system they built.36 There was 
no attempt to related private law with deontological-autonomous virtuous.
In contrast to Scholastics, jurists in 19th century started to construct a legal discourse 
criticizing the existence of a normative system where rules and principles could conflict. 
Back then, the legal discourse begun to converge to the idea that conflicting principles and 
rules would cause legal uncertainty. The solution was then to develop a theory of private law 
in which the will – as the expression of individual’s autonomy – was the cornerstone of a 
coherent, hierarchical and monistic private law system.37 
The consequence was the binary division between private and public law as two 
separate coherent systems: private Law would be based on autonomy and corrective justice, 
while public law would be based on the moral and social values of distributive justice. The 
systematization of national private law in codes was referred to as the concrete manifestation 
of this paradigm, which was reinforced by the movement of national Constitutions.38 Rules 
of private law rooted in the Aristotelian tradition of commutative justice – such as just price 
and equitable contract terms – were no longer explained by the theory of private law of 
the 19th century, despite being concepts with meaning in the philosophical synthesis of late 
scholastics.39 
To understand why classic private law thinking was so well received in the 19th 
century, James Gordley builds an analogy between the proposition of the Will Theory and 
how the theoretical construction was attractive to both prominent philosophies present in 19th 
36  Here we are talking about the late scholastic or Spanish natural law school were the first to give Roman Law a theory 
and systematic doctrinal structure. Their leaders were Domingo Soto (1494-1560), Luis de Molina (1535-1600) and Leonard 
Lessius (1554-1623). Their work deeply influenced the 17th century founders of the northern natural law school Hugo Grotius 
(1583-1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694). see James Gordley, op. cit., 1991. 
37  About the break that emerged in the 19th century by the will theorists, see James Gordley (1991); Kennedy (2006). See 
also the historical account of David Ibbetson, where he writes about the Modern Theory of Contracts, the rise of the Will 
Theory and its declined with the implementations of Legal Regulations and Contractual Fairness. Ibbetson, David. A Historical 
Introduction to the Law of Obligations. Oxford University Press, 2001.
38  See Micklitz (2014); Reich (2010). 
39  James Gordley distinguished the jurists -– Will Theorists – from philosophers who were utilitarian like Benthan or rights 
based as Kant and Hegel. While the former had a philosophical meaning of will, the jurists adopted the simplistic idea of 
what will means and impressed it into service. Gordley, James. Foundations of Private Law: Property, Tort, Contract, Unjust 
Enrichment. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
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century: the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham; and rights based theories of Immanuel Kant 
and Friedrich Hegel.40 In utilitarianism, if the task of law is to ensure that people’s preferences 
are satisfied to the greatest extent possible, the Will Theory is attractive for protecting and 
enforcing parties’ preferences; individuals’ choices. For rights-based philosophers, if law is 
obligatory because it is rooted in human freedom and autonomy, the will theory in private 
law provides the status of a right to individuals’ expression of freedom. Classic private law 
thought flourished in legal discourse with this philosophical meaning of will. 
The Will Theory separated law into two different boxes: private v. public law, corrective 
v. distributive justice, apolitical v. political, neutral v. values. The supremacy of the will of 
the parties – captured by the expression’s autonomy-based value and freedom of contract – 
serves as justification for private law thought rooted in an individualistic and philosophical 
conception of autonomy. 
To explain the difference between scholars who still uphold the classic private law 
thinking in the 21st century and those who argue in favor the modernization of private law, 
Hugh Collins illustrates the separation of the public and private systems of law as semi-
detached houses: one representing private law, the other public law. For classic private law 
thinking, the structural relation between private and public law resembles semi-detached 
houses that are inhabited entirely separately. Each legal system develops its own autonomous 
integrity and coherence and there is no interconnection. 41 
There have been two intellectual movements that uphold the deconstruction of classic 
private law thinking.42 While one intellectual development dismisses the doctrinal and legal 
theoretical foundation of classic private law by revealing its unrealistic grounds and social 
construction project, the other perceives classic private law as a theory suitable for the liberal 
State, yet that it needs to be adapted to the continuous transformations of the State in modern 
and postmodern societies.
2.1 Adjusting Theory to Realism by Philosophers of Law
The first intellectual development arguing for the modernization of private law thinking 
arose among legal philosophers who refused both the epistemological and the metaphysical 
foundations of classic, 19th century private law theory. For them, classic private law thinking 
- intentionally or non-internationally - distorts reality because it bases its metaphysical 
40  James Grodley (2006).
41  The two characterizations of the two intellectual developments were borrowed by Hugo Collins. Collins, Hugh. “The 
Impact of Human Rights Law on Contract Law in Europe.” European Business Law Review 22, no. 4 (2011): 425–35.
42  Hugo Collins uses the analogy of the two semi-detached houses to draw the distinction between two theories of private law. 
Collins, Hugh. “On the (In)compatibility of Human Rights Discourse and Private Law.” In Constitutionalization of European 
Private Law, edited by Hans-W. Micklitz, First edition. The Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law, volume 
XXII/2. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2014.
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proposition of private law on arguments that goes far from features of what private law is in 
practice. Put simply, the first intellectual development sees classic private legal thinking as 
a patient that has become ill with a condition of cognitive distortions. This is the reason why 
they do not claim to be in favor of the transformation of private law, but rather they favor the 
transformation of classic private law thought.
There are two schools of legal thought that undermine the foundation of the classic 
theory of private Law: legal realism, and critical legal studies. For legal realists, describing 
private law as an autonomous system based on the supremacy of the will of the parties is 
founded on an erroneous formalistic approach to law. If legal theories must represent 
the metaphysical views of the world, an empiricist proves that there have always been 
propositions of law solving substantive legal issues that are based on opposite rhetorical 
modes: individualism and altruism.43 As it stands, the claim that private law is not in the 
service of any external moral obligation is metaphysically and epistemologically debatable. 
This is the core point of departure for those who claim there is a disconnect between the “law 
in books with law in action”.44 
Critical legal scholars, who moved beyond the realists by applying genealogical methods 
to the study of classic private law theory, argue that the legal doctrine of an autonomous values 
was a normative theory of private law built to support the contingent distribution of wealth in 
the 19th century. 45  What was a normative will theory, which might have been well suited to 
the political conjuncture of the 19th century, has been twisted into descriptive rhetoric about 
the foundation of private law perpetuating the contingent distribution of wealth of the 19th 
century over subsequent years. 46 
2.2. Adjusting Theory to the Transformation of the State by Sociologist of Law
Rather than rejecting the foundations of classic private law thinking as a theoretical 
construction, the second intellectual development perceived it as a legal doctrine conforming 
the purposes of liberal States in the 19th century and the codification movement in Continental 
Europe.47 However, it became obsolete over time with the transformation of States. The 
43  Kennedy, Duncan. “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication.” Harvard Law Review 89, no. 8 (June 1976): 
1685–1778.
44  The distinction between “Law in book and Law in practice” is commonly associated with Oliver Wendell Holmes’ Legal 
Empiricism. About the influence of Holmes in the Realism movement see Twining, William. Karl Llewellyn and the Realist 
Movement. Second edition. Cambridge University Press, 2014. Holmes, Oliver Wendell. “The Path of Law.” Harvard Law 
Review 10 (1897): 457.
45  Kennedy, Duncan. “Toward and Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought 
in America, 1850-1940.” Research in Law and Sociology 3 (1980): 3–24.
46  Kennedy, Duncan. “From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s ‘Consideration and Form.’” 
Columbia Law Review 100, no. 94 (2000): 94–175. Kennedy, Duncan. “Formalism.” In Internatioal Encyclopedia of the Social 
Behaviour Science, Vol. 13. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001.
47  Wieacker, Franz. A History of Private Law in Europe with Particular Reference to Germany. Oxford : New York: Clarendon 
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challenge of those who argue in favor of the modernization of private law is to reconcile 
private law thinking with modern and postmodern societies. 48 To do so, the modernization of 
private law could be described from the observation of the transformation of the State from 
two dimensions, which is expressed in the metaphor of the inner and the outer face of the 
State firstly coined by Phillip Bobbitt.49
2.2.1. The inner face of States: Towards Welfare and Regulatory States 
If the classic theory of private law represented a metaphysical account of law in liberal 
States, it could no longer represent private law in welfare States in the early 20th century, 50 nor 
could it represent private law in Regulatory51 or Market States.52 Whereas Will Theorists have 
persisted in articulating private law as a coherent, monistic system grounded in autonomy (in 
its individualistic and philosophical conception), private law has changed through legislation 
and adjudication to accommodate the values of modern and postmodern societies.53 
In this account, the classic thinking started to be undermined with the rise of the 
welfare State in the early 20th century. In Europe, the pressure of social movements over 
States led to legislative reforms to protect weaker parties exposed to contractual relationships 
with an imbalance of bargaining power. Back then; Franz Wieacker classified these new rules 
restricting freedom as implications of social solidarity.54 Labor and Consumer law created 
Press; Oxford University Press, 1995.
48  Franz Wieacker (1995).
49  This work borrows from Phillip Bobbitt the terms “Inner and Outer face of States”. Nevertheless, it does so with a slight 
difference in meaning, in particular when it concerns the outer face of States. In relation to the inner face of States, Bobbitt 
uses the term to depict the way in which States regulate their own nation though State laws. To what concerns the outer face, 
Bobbitt describes how States have a strategic relationship with other States. In this article, the outer face of States represents the 
relationship that States pursue with other States and also private and public organizations that does not fall into the institutional 
category of Sovereign State. As it stands, the definition of the Outer and Inner faces of States applied in this work is more 
aligned with the description employed by Dennis Patterson and Ari Afilalo. See Bobbitt, Philip. The Shield of Achilles: War, 
Peace and the Course of History. First edition. Knopf, 2002. Patterson, Dennis M. (Dennis Michael), and Ari Afilalo. The New 
Global Trading Order: The Evolving State and the Future of Trade. Cambridge University Press, 2008.
50  Franz. Wieacker (1995).
51  Majone, Giandomenico. “The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe.” West European Politics 17, no. 3 (July 1, 1994): 77–101.
52  For Hans Micklitz, Market State is “With a view of regulatory integration, the main features of the EU Market State are 
the following: the shift from private into public - the State outsources its regulatory functions; the shift from law and regulation 
to regulation and outsourcing privatization, such as may be observed in the areas of utilities, transportation and health care. 
The bottom line: sovereignty loses its Nation State force and preserving market conditions for the maximization of economic 
opportunity”. Footnote 21, Micklitz in Lioni 2013.
53  Caruso, Daniela. “Contract Law and Distribution in the Age of Welfare Reform Symposium: AALS Section on Contracts: 
New Frontiers in Private Ordering.” Arizona Law Review 49 (2007): 665–94.
54  The claim of private legal scholars in middle 20th century for the modernization of private law thinking could not be better 
represented than the words written by Franz Wieacker in 1952. “When the exercise of its classical institutions does involve 
the use of economic or social power, the question of the role and the status of private law in the social state under the role of 
law arise starkly. Here too the Basic Law in Western Germany irrefragably guarantees rights of ownership and inheritance, 
and also, according to the prevalent and correct interpretation of its second and tenth article, freedom of contract: consistently 
with traditional individual rights, these are the freedom of individual choices. At the same time the social function of contract, 
economic rights, land ownership, capital the means of production, and economic association in our present system is undeniable: 
unlike the entrepreneurial economy the social economy sees them as a means of ensuring the distribution of sources, the 
creation of assets, and the maintenance of the necessities of life are affected in a just manner. When social considerations of this 
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rules affecting transactions and liability.
If one takes the transformation of States hand-in-hand with the dynamic change of 
law, private law presented itself as a dynamic instrument.55 In 1936, the French government 
approved the Accords of Matignon after the May-June general strike. It restrained the prior 
autonomy of employees and employers to freely negotiate weekly working hours and wages. 
By the time the German government had already passed a cartel ordinance, during the inflation 
crisis of 1923. This act reinforced State authority to restrict the autonomy of parties when 
the terms and conditions of contracts resulted in inflating surplus revenue to the detriment 
of consumers.56 Decades later, the House of Lords confirmed the punitive damages awarded 
by the jury in the famous 1964 case Rookes v Bernardes, and tort law became a regulatory 
instrument to dissuade outrageous behavior, which is far from its corrective justice purposes 
in classical private law terms. 57 
With the decline of welfare Sates and the emergence of Regulatory States, the system 
of private law took another turn in the late 20th century. Trust in market mechanisms pushed 
wide reform to open markets for competition. Public operations in heavy industries and 
public utilities were privatized and exposed to hybrid rules. Both regulation and competition 
impact private law creating duty-imposing rules to govern human behavior and, at the best, to 
pursue utilitarian values. In electricity markets, States have conferred rights for competitors 
to access transmission and distribution systems as means to increase competition and reduce 
marginal costs. There are cases in which States regulated price caps in wholesale markets (e.g. 
Ramsey pricing).58 Rights to access networks and obligations to respect price caps could be 
mandatory rules applied to transmission/distribution service contracts and supply agreements 
respectively. Both regulations are also justified through utilitarian values.
Despite undeniable changes of law and social changes through law in the last century, 
the classic concept of private law persists. This is thanks to the rhetorical discourse of Will 
Theorist in the 20th century. To defend the “Pureness” of private law, Will Theorists have 
argued that labor law and consumer law were not private law, but rather rules marginalized 
order are taken into account in way the law is applied, private rights arising from contracts (exchange, use, employment, and 
insurance), tort or liability insurance appear in a new light. They may still represent areas of freedom (notably guaranteed by the 
fundamental rights) but such freedom is now limited not only by the freedom of other individuals but also by the implications 
of social solidarity for the relationship between individuals”. Franz. Wieacker (1995), p. 486.    
55  Micklitz, Hans-W. “Social Justice and Access Justice in Private Law.” EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/02 (2011).
56  Example cited by Wieacker when arguing about the “disintegration of private law” and social law. Franz Wieacker (1995), p. 433. 
57  Weir, Tony. An Introduction to Tort Law. Second Edition. Clarendon Law Series. Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006, p. 219-220.
58  Ramsey Pricing are temporary mandatory rules imposed to every transaction of electricity wholesale throughout a certain 
period of time, when high demand picks increases excessively revenues of producers for natural accidents or some sort of 
market failure. Cap prices are regulatory mechanism imposed by States on market actors. Differently from traditional protective 
measures of consumer law, these rules aim is to protect demand-side. 
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as hybrid law. The same argument was extended to justify the exclusion of market regulation 
rules from the branch of private law to a sort of economic/administrative law.
When the Will Theorist marginalized this set of rules based on social values from what 
they perceive as the “pure private law”, it provoked not only the rupture between private law 
in books and law in action, but it also provoked a negative impact upon the latter. The impact 
upon legal practice happens where there is a lack of legal consciousness among individuals 
about their rights and duties and how to privately enforce them. If regulation enshrines duties 
of contracts applied to two persons making transactions, the non-compliance with duty-
imposing could hold complaints based on private remedies (e.g. breach of contract). The lack 
of legal consciousness, therefore, diminishes the effectiveness of the legal systems.
2.2.2. The outer face of States: Globalization, Europeanization, and Europeanization 
of Private Law
If explaining the transformation of States together with the transformation of private 
law is a way to deconstruct the classic concept within States, this exercise is harder when the 
objective is deconstructing the classic thought of law beyond States. 
There is one reason why international lawyers are even more resistant to the modern 
theories of private law. While the classic concept within States restrains private law thinking 
to conferring-power rules, there are no conferring-power rules beyond national legal systems 
ensuring the enforcement of individuals’ will. There are agreements between States committed 
to the mutual recognition of conferring-power rules given by States to individuals. These are 
the grounds of International private law. If so, international public lawyers are inclined to 
deny that supranational imposing-duties rules governing transactions, property or torts are 
hybrid rules with characteristics of public and private law at the transnational level. 
International private law corresponds to a set of rules determining the applicable law 
and competent jurisdiction to solve conflicts in cross-border transactions. Therefore, as Horatia 
Murr-Watt asserts,59  international private law has little to say about the reconfiguration of 
sovereign authority60 and the rise of transnational functional regimes. 
By functional regimes, Horatia Murr-Watt means the growth of duty-imposing rules 
at transitional level governing commercial contracts, (intellectual) property rights, and the 
liability of multinational corporations which is neither captured in the classic concept of 
private law, nor international private law. Therefore, there is a tendency of public International 
59  Muir-Watt, Horatia. “Private International Law beyond the Schism.” Transnational Legal Theory 2 (2011).
60  Hans Lindall starts his new book on “Legal Authority and Globalization of Inclusion and Exclusion” by contextualizing 
the conflict between Monsanto and Indian farmers regarding the enforcement of patent rights against Indian farmers. However, 
the understanding of the phenomenon from the Private Law perspective is not his focus. Private Law plays an important role to 
explain the reaction of Indian farmers against the charge of royalties. Hans Lindahl, “Authority and Globalization of Inclusion 
and Exclusion”, Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
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lawyers to combine duty-imposing rules applied to States to remove tariffs for trade together 
with imposing-duties rules prohibiting individuals from using seeds with patents in foreign 
jurisdictions. The issue here is that International public law can explain the public enforcement 
of WTO rules obliging States to remove tariffs for trade, but it cannot explain the second 
phenomenon properly. It lacks tools to explain the impact of TRIPs upon private law, as 
well as how Monsanto conducted the private enforcement of patent rights against farmers in 
Indian National Courts before recognition of the patent by India.61
Unfortunately, the persistence of the classic concept of private law is then reproduced 
in the studies of law beyond States; in transitional and international law. The theory of private 
law as a coherent, hierarchical, monistic system of law based on autonomy based-values 
is the product of the vertical modulation of law into a black-box model. 62 The black-box 
model is the metaphor first used by William Twining to represent the misrepresentation of 
the phenomenon of law in general and, most importantly, to represent the transnational law. 
Law is still taught through the binary of national and international private law, and public and 
private law. Therefore, if national lawyers are still narrowing down private law as conferring-
power rules at the national level because of the classic concept of private law, imposing-
duties rules of private law beyond States are left drifting along lifeless. Neither International 
private law, nor the classic concept of private law is useful to explain globalization.  
Globalization refers to the increasing cross-border movement of goods, services, 
capital, and citizens which affect both traditional fields of international law. For International 
Public Law, Sates are still holding authority to either rule their nations or delegate that 
authority to supranational bodies, on the other hand States no longer have the capacity 
to regulate actions and events that transcend territorial jurisdictions of sovereign States 63 
International law represented by the black-box model is bound to fail in postmodern society, 
where law needs to be dynamic as much as technology changes. 
Being Law a social phenomenon, globalization demands transnational rules to govern 
61  Bobbitt named as Opaque Sovereignty. See Bobbitt, Philip. Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. 
First American edition. A.A. Knopf, 2008. See also MacCormick, Neil. Questioning Sovereignty. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999. 
62  The metaphor of the black-box model was firstly coined by William Twining and later used by Tuori. Twining, William. 
General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
63  The increase of global trade has concomitantly reduced the regulatory capacity of the Sovereign States in the production 
of the transnational normativity. On the one hand, some scholars refer to this phenomenon as the vanishing of the Sovereign 
State. On the other hand, others hold the idea that the State is crossing a transformation process, istead of disappearing. To 
mention some of the latter, Dennis Patterson and Ari Afilalo (2008), Philip Bobbitt (2002). Sassen, Saskia. Territory, Authority, 
Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton University Press, 2008. Stven Steimo, The Evolution of Modern 
States: Sweeden, Japan, and United States. New York: Cambridge University Press (2010). Also J Sgard, E Brousseau and 
Y Schemeil, ‘Sovereignty without Borders: On Individual Rights, the Delegation to Rule and Globalization’ Working Paper, 
Sciences-po, CERI, 2010. 
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global movement of goods, services and people.64 Transnational law emerged then, and have 
become a field of research that has attracted massive attention from scholars. Scholars who 
were rooted in the traditional fields of law – constitutional law, administrative law, private 
law – have made efforts to understand the phenomenon of transnational law, but they did 
so sometimes transposing classic concepts of their disciplines to the transnational level. 65 
As a result, some studies on the attempt to understand transnational law fail for transposing 
to the global arena the black-box model; the classic divisions of public and private law. 
Transnational law, therefore, has exposed even more the fragile foundations of the classic 
concept of private law. Globalization has led to a disorder of orders 66 and somebody inside 
the black-box cannot discern the lack of conformity between theories of law and law in action 
in this global era. 
In an effort to systematize private legal scholarship that challenged classic private 
law by looking at the various manifestations of private law beyond the state, Ralph Michaels 
and Nils Jansen 67 grouped private law under three headings according to the subject of their 
research: Europeanization of private law, globalization of private law, and privatization of 
private law. 68 Considering the first session already  introduced the Europeanization of private 
law, lets us focus in the other two categories.
The globalization of private law imagines private law made by supra-governmental 
bodies.69 It refers to imposing-duty rules governing contract law, property rights, and tort law 
64  Phillip Jessup coined the term transnational law in 1956. “The problems to be examined are in large part those which are 
usually called international, and to be examined consists of the rule applicable to be to these problems. But the term “international” 
is misleading since it suggests that one is concerned only with the relations of one nation (or state) to the other nation (state). (…) 
I shall use, instead of using the term ‘international law’, the term ‘transnational law’ to include all law which regulates actions 
or events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are included, as are other rules which do not 
wholly fit into such standard category”. Jessup, Phillip. Transnational Law. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1956.     
65  Legal scholars have intensively engaged in researchers whose subjects are new modes of law making, judicial and 
non-judicial adjudication emerging at the global level by asking how those novels could affect the traditional concept of 
law in itself. Among those scholars, four trends of research can be roughly identified by the similarities of their analytical 
arguments. Constitutionalism as Krisch, Nico. Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law. 
Oxford Constitutional Theory. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. Fragmentation of law as Koskenniemi, 
Martti. “Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the Ethos of Legal Education.” European Jo, 2007. Global administrative law 
as Kingsbury, Benedict, Nico Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart. “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law.” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 68, no. 3 (2005): 15–62. Legal pluralism as Teubner, Gunther. “Global Bukowina: Legal Pluralism in 
the World Society.” In Global Law without a State, edited by Gunther Teubner. Studies in Modern Law and Policy. Aldershot ; 
Brookfield, USA: Dartmouth, 1997. Benda-Beckmann, Franz von. “Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?” The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law, December 2, 2013. Berman, Paul Schiff. “Global Legal Pluralism.” Southern California Review 
80 (2007): 1155. Calliess, Gralf-Peter, and Peer Zumbansen. Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of Transnational 
Private Law. Hart Monographs in Transnational and International Law, v. 5. Oxford: Hart, 2010. 
66  Neil Walker. “Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders.” 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 6, no. 3–4 (July 1, 2008): 373–96.
67  Michaels, Ralf. “Globalization and Law: Law Beyond the State.” In Law and Social Theory, edited by Reza Banakar and 
Max Travers, Second edition. Hart Publishing, 2013.
68  The three headings of legal scholarship studying the emergence of private law beyond the State, which are identified by 
Ralf Michaels and Nils Jansen, either aim to empirically prove the existence of private law beyond State or propose a theory of 
the about how this law affect our understanding of law. Michaels and Jansen (2013),
69  Michaels and Jansen (2013), p. 864-868
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of States made by the WTO when adjudicating trade disputes. 70 It also defines private law 
derived from arbitral awards as a source of lex mercatoria,71 whose validity and normativity 
is derivative of the New York Convention.72 Though not a novel phenomenon, Globalization 
of private law serves as a counter-example to the classic concept of private law as conferring-
power rules made by States. Contract law doctrines based on arbitral awards reinforce the 
evidence of lex mercatoria as a set of duty-imposing rules.
Ralf Michaels and Nils Jansen also identify another category of private law beyond 
States that calls classic private law into question: the phenomenon of the privatization of 
private law. Nowadays, a large body of empirical research underpins descriptive analyses 
of functional regimes made and sometimes adjudicated by private bodies like NGOs, 
private associations, and private corporations. Different from supranational governmental 
organizations, the normativity of the rules of these private regimes (or systems) is not 
grounded in the social contract as means to confer power (i.e. the social contract confers 
power to States that in turn confer power to supranational governmental bodies).
By contrast, the validation of private regimes is grounded in consent. National and 
supranational governmental bodies have no or have a minor role in making or adjudicating 
the rules. When internet users wish to register a domain name, they give their consent to 
be governed by the ICANN’s approved terms and conditions. When a person uses a digital 
platform to offer or purchase goods, a click in the check box is the manifestation of consent, 
which makes the terms and conditions of digital platforms binding to private contractual 
relationships. Privatization of private law does not mean that rules don’t or cannot pursue 
social values. This author recently received a notice about changes in standard-form 
contracts from Airbnb. The terms and condition were amended to include obligations of non-
discrimination. Moreover, privatization of private law also does not infer the emergence of 
autonomous systems (i.e. systems independent of national and international systems of law, 
which is different from autonomous value). Anna Becker shows us how German and English 
Courts have turned Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) standards into binding rules of 
law by recognizing their normative strength with regard to third parties. 73 The International 
70  Micklitz, Hans-W. “The Internal vs. the External Dimension of European Private Law – a Conceptual Design and a 
Research Agenda.” EUI Working Papers LAW 2015/35 (2015).
71  Lex Mercatoria, which is a transnational body of substantive rules created by practices of commerce and applied by 
International Arbitration. See Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving (2011), and Claire Cutler, Private Power and 
Public Authority: Transnational Merchant Law (2003). 
72  The Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards by New York Convention confers powers to Arbitral Courts the make rules 
of private law by adjudicating commercial disputes. Donald B. King, Does an Unknown Exist? Impact of Commercial and 
Consumer Law (2003).
73  Beckers, Anna. Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes : On Global Self-Regulation and National Private Law. 
Hart Publishing, 2015.
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Safe Harbor Privacy Principles reinforces Dennis Patterson and Ari Afilalo’s proposition 
that functional systems are not autonomous systems, but rather systems that work under the 
acquiescence of sovereign States.74 
Like lex digitale 75 or CSR, there are several other functional regimes that illustrate the 
Privatization of private law at local, national or transnational levels. Lex Sportiva 76 is another 
example of a body of law at the transnational level. Intrigued by the evolving power of these 
functional systems, legal and political scholars have questioned to what extent someone’s 
consent to opt-out or opt-in to these functional regimes can still be considered voluntary 
consent. They emphasized the fact that functional regimes work like gatekeepers. To access 
facilities and associations that are either part of our daily habits or conditional on access certain 
markets, consent is the key. Facebook’s terms and conditions are not individually negotiated 
and users’ express consent only by opting-in or opting-out. Soccer teams have to consent 
to FIFA’s terms and conditions to access UEFA Championing Leagues. The power of these 
functional systems justifies what Gunther Teubner called Transnational Private Constitutional 
Orders aligned with traditional legal systems: national and international legal systems.77 
Globalization and the privatization of private law are factual claims against the 
persistence of the classic concept of private law. These categories reveal the inconsistences 
between the theory of will in books and law in practice. However, besides the theoretical 
misrepresentations, the classic concept also has a negative impact on law in practice. 
When scholars observe the privatization of private law, the private law dimension 
is self-evident. NGOs, standard bodies, or digital platforms are organizations whose legal 
constitution relies on corporate and contract law. Normative theories such as Transnational 
Private Constitutional Orders or Global Administrative Law attempt to construct legal 
discourses imposing sort of (universal) social values to those systems of law, which have 
a widely recognized private dimension. On the other hand, the globalization of private 
law, which came into being through International Organizations, has delegation authority 
and a policy mandate set out by States and though States, which means that the private 
dimension is often obfuscated by the public law dimension. The reason why is (again) the 
misrepresentation of private law through the Will Theory. If the classic concept is put aside, 
the legal consciousness of the private dimension of International Treaties, either regulating 
74  Patterson and Afilalo (2008).
75  Dirk, Lehmkuhl. “The Resolution of Domain Names v S Trademark Conflicts: A Case Study on Regulation Beyond the 
Nation State and Related Problems.” Zeitschrift Für Rechtssoziologie 23, no. 1 (2002): 61–78.
76  Duval, Antoine. “Lex Sportiva: A Playground for Transnational Law.” European Law Journal 19, no. 6 (November 1, 
2013): 822–42.
77  Teubner, Gunther. Constitutional Fragments: Societal Constitutionalism and Globalization. Oxford University Press, 2012.
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intellectual property rights or Trade, will be enhanced in the legal community. The outcome 
would be a better understanding of how plural legal systems interact,78 as well as an increase 
in legal consciousness and a more effectiveness International legal system. Even taking into 
account the genuine normative concerns of scholars against private enforcement,79 none can 
deny that the European constitutionalism was the result of the infant legal consciousness of 
the private dimension of EU Law.
3. Are we all pluralists? Legal Consciousness, Private Enforcement, and Effectiveness
On one hand some private legal scholars have agreed with the empirical-analytical 
claim that we are all living in legal pluralism; therefore, the classic concept of private law 
is died, or must die. Yet sometimes their normative proposals to better regulate private law 
relation in plural legal orders go in opposite directions. Here we have arrived precisely at the 
point in time that this chapter began: the DCFR and the battle between the legal pluralist and 
the monists. 
On the one side of the spectrum, legal scholars argue that pluralism and functionalism in 
private law is an inescapable consequence of postmodern society, as well as the transformation 
of the classic concept of private law. Hence, legal pluralism is not a phenomenon exclusive 
to private law in Europe, but to law in general. 80 The increase in the complexity of voluntary 
and involuntary transaction, driven mostly by technology and globalization, walks hand-in-
hand with the increase in complexity of how to regulate these transactions, 81 which is done 
through rules of private law. Therefore, having general principles of private law that can be 
applied indiscriminately to all transactions is no longer suitable in postmodern era, as it was 
perceived to have been by the codification projects of Roman law projects in the 19th century. 
82 For them, the “plan of a more coherent EU Contract law” is unfeasible in an unsystematic 
law. On the same side of the spectrum, there are also private lawyers who have advocated that 
78  Berman (2006), Zumbansen and Calliess (2010).  
79  When scholars reject the private law dimension of International Law and EU Law, but at the same endorse the proposition 
that they are “hybrid” legal systems, this article is not categorically inferring they are all deluded by the classic concept of 
Private Law. Some scholars have a normative claim that justifies their dismissive position towards private law. Some of them 
argue that the Sovereignty of States must be conserved, others for the coherence of International Law (or non-fragmentations). 
By increasing legal consciousness of the private law dimension of International Treaties, more individuals would feel entitled 
to rights created by International and Supranational authorities. 
80  Theory and concept of legal pluralism have long spurred discussion in legal theory, legal sociology and legal anthropology. 
See James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Consti tutionalism in an Age of Diversity, 1995.  Tamanaha, Brian Z. “A Non‐Essentialist 
Version of Legal Pluralism.” Journal of Law and Society 27, no. 2 (2000): 296–321. Tamanaha, Brian Z. “Understanding 
Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global.” Sidney Law Review 30, no. 3 (September 2007). Tamanaha, Brian Z., 
Caroline Mary Sage, and Michael J. V. Woolcock. Legal Pluralism and Development: Scholars and Practitioners in Dialogue. 
Cambridge University Press, 2012.
81  Twining (2010).
82  Micklitz, Hans-W. “The (Un)-Systematics of (Private) Law as an Element of European Culture.” In Towards a European 
Legal Culture, edited by Geneviève Helleringer and Kai Purnhagen. Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Verlag C.H. Beck 
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pluralism in private law in Europe is not only unavoidable, but is desirable83. Regardless of 
the justification for legal pluralism in private law, if it is unavoidable or desirable, pluralist 
legal scholars have vehemently rejected any attempt to systematize European Private into 
what could be perceived as the harmonization of European Private Law into a transnational 
Civil Code. 
On the other side of the spectrum, there are private legal scholars who disagree 
with this normative pluralist approach. The vicarious opponent of any effort of European 
harmonization in private law has been Pierre Legrand. 84 Some of the drafters of the DCFR 
were also scholars’ discontent with Pluralism, who saw in the European Codification Project 
as a way out of pluralism and a way back to monism.
Thinking that private law in postmodern society is per se or should be functional and plural 
goes against the development of the DCFR in 2008/2009 and later the CFR in 2011 under the 
auspices of the Redding Commission, as well as the CESL. The major mistake of all the European 
Codification Projects in the 2000s has been the reliance on the belief that the harmonization (or 
systematization) of national Civil Codes at the European level would lead to the coherence of 
private law. Their mistake was looking at European Private law with the same lens that classic 
private lawyers looked at Roman law in 19th century. The DCFR then could be seen as an attempt 
to reproduce the same project as civil law codification in the 19th century, which could have been 
suitable for non-complex societies ruled by Liberal States in 19th century. 
The European Codification Project was a political fiasco, as was discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, and the DCFR is now relegated to scientific fiction section in 
bookstores. Regardless of the belief that codification might have recreated a monistic legal 
system, the failure of the DCFR project leads us to the conclusion that indeed we are all 
living in legal pluralism and will continue to do so. 85 As things stand, what is the role of 
European private legal scholarship in the postmodern era, when private law is unequivocally 
plural? To answer this question, I found inspiration in Ralf Michaels’ assertion about theories 
and Hart Publishing, 2014.
83  Benda-Beckmann, Franz von. “Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?” The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 
December 2, 2013. Michaels, Ralf. “Why We Have No Theory of European Private Law Pluralism.” In Pluralism and European 
Private Law, edited by Leone Niglia. Oxford: Hart, 2013.
84  Arguably, the most vociferous opponent of greater European Harmonization efforts is Pierre Legrand. Legrand, Pierre. 
“Antivonbar.” Journal of Comparative Law 1, no. 1 (2005).
85  It is undisputable that the Euro-crisis and Gauweiler case revived the discussion about whether the EU legal system could 
still be conceived as a Constitutional plural order. Some scholars have argued that the decision of CJEU on the OMT’s policy 
represents a new stage of constitutionalism of the EU towards a fully monist order. However, this article is in agreement with 
scholars who see it as foregone conclusion. CJEU’s judgement in favour of the legality of the OMT emission was referred by 
the German Constitutional Court, which is still holding powers to review CJEU decisions in strict circumstances (ultra-virus 
review, human rights review, and identify review). If indeed the German Constitutional Court decided to follow the CJEU in 
such controversial case, it could be seen as a treat to the European Plural Constitutional, but any conclusion is no more than 
speculations. C-62-14. Gauweiler case. See Christiaan Timmermans, The Magic World of Constitutional Pluralism. 
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on globalization. “Paradigm shifts happen neither in reality nor in ideology but in your ways 
of understanding the world”. 86
Even though the EU did not bring to life the supranational civil code, it left behind its 
legacy, which was the academic debate triggered by the draft proposal. The DCRF gathered 
private legal scholars from different Member-States and legal cultures to discuss Law, Civil 
Codes, and the concept of private law. Discussions and academic production about the DCFR 
and the private dimension of the European Integration project is the true legacy of EU. It is a 
large amount of material that serves as evidence to contest the validity of the classic concept 
of private law embedded in national legal systems in Europe and abroad. This legacy needs to 
shift from European Legal Scholarship to national legal Scholarships within Member States 
and civil law countries beyond the EU.
Within States, there is a need to increase of legal consciousness of European private 
law. There are national Courts endorsing the direct horizontal effects of EU law, which is 
combined with the EU initiative of creating procedural out-of-court mechanisms to solve 
private disputes. However, private enforcement will remain underdeveloped if market actors 
do not share awareness of the existence of their rights.   
The current work of European private lawyers will create a legacy for the already on-
going debate about the emergence of private law beyond the State. Different from the worldwide 
literature on Privatization and Globalization of Private Law, European private law emerges in 
a transnational legal system as a legal system beyond State, but with policy mandate. Rather 
than trying to stifle conflict through an imposition of Universalist harmonizing schemes (e.g. 
supranational constitutions or codes), EU institutions have been innovative in seeking a wide 
variety of procedural mechanisms and practices for managing hybridity without eliminating 
it.87 In an era where more and more transnational legal systems emerge with policy-driven 
competence to build free and common markets, the EU experience will serve as blue print. 
These new Integration Projects replicate European negative integration and, sometimes, even 
positive integration (e.g. TTIP and TTP).88  If one agrees that the European Integration Project 
will unavoidably spill over into private law, lessons from European Private Law on how to 
understand these modes of transnationalization of private law are worthwhile.89 
86  Michaels, Ralf. “Globalization and Law: Law Beyond the State.” In Law and Social Theory, edited by Reza Banakar and 
Max Travers, Second edition. Hart Publishing, 2013.
87   Berman, Paul Schiff. “Global Legal Pluralism.” Southern California Review 80 (2007): 1155.
88  Regional Trade Agreements – like TTP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership) – have raised concerns among international legal scholars with regard to the insertion of principles that have long 
been part of the EU legal order such as the principles of direct effect and supremacy of the supranational legal order. Since 
these discussions have long been in the core of the academic debate in Europe, there is a lot to learn from the old continent.
89  See the infant project of Hans-W. Micklitz (2015).
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